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Abstract
In this paper, we tackle a generic optimal regime switching problem where the decision
making process is not the same from a regime to another. Precisely, we consider a simple
model of optimal switching from competition to cooperation. To this end, we solve a two-
stage optimal control problem. In the first stage, two players engage in a dynamic game
with a common state variable and one control for each player. We solve for open-loop
strategies with a linear state equation and linear-quadratic payoffs. More importantly, the
players may also consider the possibility to switch at finite time to a cooperative regime
with the associated joint optimization of the sum of the individual payoffs. Using the-
oretical analysis and numerical exercises, we study the optimal switching strategy from
competition to cooperation. We also discuss the reverse switching.
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1 Introduction
The recent years have noticed the emergence of numerous debates on the opportunity
and timing of very different types of transitions, each associated with a bunch of aca-
demic works in the economic and operational research literatures: environmental tran-
sitions (in particular the energy transition, see the early work of Tsur and Zemel, 2003),
political transitions (among others, transition to democracy following Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006), organizational transitions (either in markets or in the workplace, see
Valle´e and Moreno, 2011) etc...In most of these works, the optimal timing of transitions
(if any) are only implicitly tackled though the vast majority of the models developed
are dynamic.1
There exist however an increasing number of papers interested in optimal regime
transition and the inherent timing. As a common feature, all these papers use multi-
stage optimal control techniques, first developed by Tomiyama (1984). This notably
covers technological regimes switching (Boucekkine et al., 2004, or Saglam, 2011) and
environmental transitions (see Boucekkine et al., 2013, or Moser et al., 2014).2 Not
surpisingly, given the nature of problems tackled in the latter literature, the decisions
are taken by a single player, say the central planner. However, in many cases, from
one stage to another, the decision makers may differ. For example, from dictatorship
to democracy, we have to move from a regime in which initially almost all the deci-
sions are taken by a dictator, to a regime in which at the very least, the decisions are
taken in a more collective way (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, in a frame without
multi-stage optimal control, and Boucekkine et al., 2016, with multi-stage optimal con-
trol). Similar considerations arise when analyzing international climate agreements
processes where we typically switch from a regime with country-level decision mak-
ing and no cooperation, for example prior to the 2015 Paris agreement, to a regime of
institutional cooperation with joint decision making. On a more technical ground, the
1This is specially true in the political transitions literature, with the notable exception of Boucekkine
et al., 2016.
2Applications to macroeconomic policy switching, e.g. Zampolli et al. (2016), or to workplace orga-
nization as in the above cited paper by Valle´e and Moreno, 2011, can be also found.
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economic literature is rather very poor in papers merging multi-stage optimal control
and dynamic games ingredients. The corresponding operational research literature is
less poor (see for example Boucekkine et al., 2011).
In this paper, we shall deal with a generic regime switching problem where the de-
cision making process is not the same from a regime to another. Precisely, we consider
a simple model of optimal switching from competition to cooperation. We believe this
problem is generic enough to cover a large set of problems. In addition to the dawn
of multinational agreements, it can be also applied to political parties or companies
mergers within a country.3 Needless to say, the reverse can happen, and one can notice
situations in which long time cooperation comes to an end and a further competition
regime sets in. Canada in 2011 pulled out of the Kyoto protocol, USA withdrew from
the Paris Agreement in 2017, and it is very likely that the UK will brexit by the end of
January 2020. In this kind of situation, the decision making process changes as well.
A quite rich set of questions arises from the examples given above: what are the
tradeoffs involved in the decision to move from competition to cooperation (and vice
versa), and what is the optimal timing for the institutional regime change if any? Since
addressing these questions involves dealing with strategic tradeoffs in dynamic set-
tings, it implies embedding dynamic games ingredients in multi-stage optimal control
problems. As outlined above, the economic literature is rather thin in this respect.
There is a substantial applied game theory literature of endogenous coalition forma-
tion (see for example Di Bartolomeo et al (2006), who study how coalitions among fiscal
and monetary authorities are formed and what are their effects on the stabilization of
output and prices). However, it generally pays no attention to the regime switching
problem described above.4
3For example, in December 2003, the Progressive-Conservative Party and the Reform/Canadian
Alliance parties merged and created a new right-wing political formation, the Conservative Party of
Canada. In October 2007, the two most important Italian left-wing parties merged into a single political
entity, the Democratic Party.
4Also, and even more clearly, our research questions and inherent settings are quite different from the
classical literature on cooperative and noncooperative R&D (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Suzu-
mura, 1992), research joint ventures (Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992) or the empirical work of Cassiman
3
In this paper, we propose a preliminary exploration of the latter switching prob-
lem. To this end, we solve a two-stage optimal control problem. In the first stage,
two players “compete” on a common state variable which could be a public good or a
public bad. They engage in a dynamic game in this first stage, and we solve for open-
loop strategies. Arguably, under the current setting, the interesting equilibrium is the
path strategies, i.e., open-loop strategies, given the fact that usually the commitment ex-
tend over the entire future time and negotiation results depend on the initial condition.
Thus, the strategy may not be subgame perfect by definition, which gives possibility
for changing in some future time. The decision rule strategies, i.e., the Markovian strate-
gies, are subgame perfect Nash equilibria, but no commitment at all is possible, thus
does not fit our examples above. As the state equation and the individual payoffs are
linear-quadratic, the resulting dynamic game would be a conceptually trivial problem
if no perspective of switching to a cooperative regime emerges. We do introduce such a
possibility with the associated joint optimization of the sum of the individual payoffs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the differential game
setting. Section 3 provides the open-loop strategies during the non-cooperate and co-
operative periods, thus the optimal switching conditions can be obtained. In Section 4,
we turn to the numerical analysis that illustrates and deepens the theoretical findings.
Section 5 provides extra discussion of the other direction of the game, that is, from
cooperate to noncooperative, and Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple model of optimal switching
There are two players: players 1 and 2, who share a common variable, y ∈ [0, Y ],
which could be public good or public bad. Each player chooses the level of a variable
xi ∈ [0, X] ⊂ [0,+∞), which provides her with utility. At the same time, their choice
increases the level of y, which induces a loss in utility. Let us assume that at time 0,
players play a non-cooperative dynamic game, choosing their optimal trajectory for
and Veugelers (2002). Essentially, these models are static and can not show switching conditions from
noncooperative to cooperative games and vise versa.
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xi. Then, since their individual choices affect equally the common variable, they could
decide to switch strategies at a time T and continue playing strategically. Indeed, in
this paper players can optimally choose a time T to start playing cooperatively.
Let us provide an example from Economics that will accompany us throughout
the paper. We can assume that there exists a unique final good, which requires only
a polluting resource as input. With a quantity xi of pollution, the firm produces an
amount aixi of the final good. Consumption provides the player with utility, but at the
same time it increases the level of CO2 emissions, y. Obviously, the level of CO2 affects
both players. In the end, the player can obtain utility directly from the consumption of
xi, but she also suffers from pollution, so she will receive disutility from y.
The objective of player i = 1, 2 is to maximize overall welfare, defined as
max
xi
Wi =
∫ +∞
0
e−rt
[
aixi − x
2
i
2
− biy
2
2
]
dt,
which depends on her individual choice, xi and which is subject to the dynamic con-
straint:
y˙(t) = xi + xj − δy(t), i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j, y(0) = y0 given. (1)
Welfare is the sum of instantaneous utility from time zero. Instantaneous utility at a
time t ≥ 0 is given by aixi − x
2
i
2
− biy2
2
. As mentioned, xi is the choice of player i. The
cost of choosing xi is
x2i
2
, thus the net gain from xi is aixi − x
2
i
2
, with ai(≥ X) positive
constant measuring the unit gain.
An increase in the state variable y has a negative effect on utility. Indeed, as in
our example where y is the stock of CO2 emissions, then any increase in y induces a
damage biy
2
2
, with scaling parameter bi, a positive constant.
Suppose that at some future date T , the two players decide to play cooperatively.
Then, the join objective is
max
xi,xj
WII(T ) =
∫ +∞
T
e−rt
[
aixi + ajxj −
x2i + x
2
j
2
− (bi + bj)y
2
2
]
dt,
subject to the same state equation (1).
For simplicity reasons, we only consider here the symmetric case where ai = aj = a
and bi = bj = b.
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Remark 1 The difficulty of considering the asymmetric case is to provide the sharing principal
in the second period. Here, in the symmetric case, the two share equally the gain.
In the following, we compute the optimal switching time T . Denote by WI(T ) wel-
fare of a player playing non-cooperative, from time 0 to the switching time T , when
she starts playing cooperatively. Then, the player solves the following problem
max
xi
WI(T ) =
∫ T
0
e−rt
[
aixi − x
2
i
2
− biy
2
2
]
dt,
subject to the law of motion (1).
The optimal choice of T is given by the solution of
max
T
[
WI(T ) + e
−rTWII(T )
2
]
. (2)
If T = 0, then it is optimal for the two players to play cooperatively immediately;
while if T = +∞, the noncooperative game should continue forever.
3 The optimal switching strategy
As in Boucekkine et al. (2004) and the references after them, we solve first the second
stage problem. Optimal trajectories for x and y are obtained in case the players play
cooperatively from T onwards. Second, taking T as given, we solve the first non-
cooperative game. We obtain optimal trajectories in both phases that depend on y0 and
T . Finally, the optimal switching time T is obtained substituting the resulting WI and
WII into (2), and solving the resulting problem. As a result, the optimal solution will
be made of an optimal switching time T , and the optimal trajectories for y and x before
and after the switch.
3.1 The cooperative regime
The joint symmetric optimization problem can be restated as:
max
x
WII(T ) =
∫ +∞
T
e−rt
[
2ax− x2 − by2] dt,
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subject to the state equation
y˙(t) = 2x− δy(t),
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and where y(0) = y0 is given. Define the associated Hamiltonian as
HII(x, y, λII) = 2ax− x2 − by2 + λII(2x− δy(t)), (3)
with λII the co-state variable. The first order conditions yield the following set of
optimal conditions 
xII = a+ λII ,
y˙II(t) = −δy + 2λII + 2a,
λ˙II(t) = 2by + (r + δ)λII ,
(4)
with transversality condition lim
t→+∞
e−rty(t)λII(t) = 0.
Next proposition provides the analytical solution to (4). We do not reproduce here
the proof since it is a standard exercise.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the two players play the cooperative game from time T onwards,
then the optimal effort is given by (4). The corresponding state and costate variables are given
by:  yII(t) = 2C1eµt + y,λII(t) = (µ+ δ)C1eµt + λ, (5)
where t ≥ T and µ = r−
√
r2+4[δ(r+δ)+4b]
2
(< 0). Constant C1 will be determined later by the
transversality condition y(T−) = y(T+).
Moreover, there exists a unique steady state (y, λ) given by
y =
2a(r + δ)
δ(r + δ) + 4b
, λ = − 4ab
δ(r + δ) + 4b
.
Associated to this steady state, we can compute the steady state of xII ,
x¯ = a+ λ¯ = a
(
1− 4b
δ(r + δ) + 4b
)
.
Corollary 1 Both y¯ and x¯ increase with a, they decrease with b.
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Obviously if T = 0, that is, if the cooperation starts from the beginning, then y(T ) =
y(0) = y0 and C1 = y0−y2 . It is easy to check that the optimal joint welfare is in this case
W ∗II(0) =
2a(a+ λ)− (a+ λ)2 − by
r
+
(µ+ δ)2C21
2µ− r +
2C1(b+ (µ+ δ)λ)
µ− r . (6)
3.2 The non-cooperative regime
Let us solve the first period non-cooperative game for a switching time T given. The
first period optimization problem for player i is
max
xi
WI(T ) =
∫ T
0
e−rt
[
aixi − x
2
i
2
− biy
2
2
]
dt,
subject to
y˙(t) = xi + xj − δy(t),
for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, and where y(0) = y0 is given. The associated Hamiltonian is
HI(xi, y, λI) = aixi − x
2
i
2
− biy
2
2
+ λI(xi + xj − δy(t)), (7)
with λI co-state variable in the first period. In the symmetric setting, the first order
conditions yield the following set of optimal conditions:
xI = a+ λI ,
y˙I(t) = −δyI + 2λI + 2a,
λ˙I(t) = by + (r + δ)λI ,
(8)
Proposition 2 below provides the analytical solution to the first order conditions in
(8). Its proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose that at time T , the two players start playing the cooperative game.
Then, for t ∈ [0, T ], the unique symmetric strategic Nash equilibrium is xI(t) = a + λI , with
state, yI , and costate variables, λI , given by
yI(t) = aˆ e
ν1t + bˆ eν2t + yP (t),
λI(t) = cˆ e
ν1t + dˆ eν2t + λP (t),
(9)
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in which ν1 and ν2 are eigenvalues given by
ν1 =
r −√r2 + 4[δ(r + δ) + 2b]
2
, ν2 =
r +
√
r2 + 4[δ(r + δ) + 2b]
2
.
(yP (t), λP (t)) is a special solution:
yP (t) = yˆP (1− eν1t) + yP (1− eν2t),
λP (t) = λˆP (1− eν1t) + λP (1− eν2t),
with
yˆP =
2a(ν2 + δ)
ν1(ν1 − ν2) , yP = −
2a(ν1 + δ)
ν2(ν1 − ν2) ,
λˆP =
a(ν1 + δ)(ν2 + δ)
ν1(ν1 − ν2) , λP = −
a(ν1 + δ)(ν2 + δ)
ν2(ν1 − ν2) .
Constants â, b̂, ĉ, d̂ are given by
â =
−(ν2 + δ)y0 + 2λ0
ν1 − ν2 , b̂ =
(ν1 + δ)y0 − 2λ0
ν1 − ν2
and
ĉ =
(ν1 + δ)[−(ν2 + δ)y0 + 2λ0]
2(ν1 − ν2) , d̂ =
(ν2 + δ)[(ν1 + δ)y0 − 2λ0]
2(ν1 − ν2) ,
where y0 is given initial condition, while λ0 will be determined by the switching condition at
time T .
A special case arises when T = +∞, that is, when no cooperation is possible. Here
the solution of (8) with transversality condition limt→+∞ e−rty(t)λI(t) = 0, is
yI(t) = 2C1I e
ν1t + yI ,
λI(t) = C1I e
ν1t + λI ,
(10)
where C1I =
y0−yI
2
and the steady state (yI , λI) =
(
2a(r+δ)
δ(r+δ)+2b
,− 2ab
δ(r+δ)+2b
)
. In this special
case, each player’s social welfare is
W ∗I (+∞) =
a(a+ λI)− (a+ λI)2/2− byI/2
r
+
(ν1 + δ)
2C21I
2(2ν1 − r) +
C1I(b+ (ν1 + δ)λI)
ν1 − r . (11)
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From (6) and (11), it is easy to check that
W ∗II
2
(+∞)−W ∗I (+∞) Q 0,
depending on the combination of parameters. In other words, it is possible that the
switching happens at T = 0, or T = +∞, or T ∈ (0,+∞), depending on the situation
under study, which can also be seen in the Section 4 with numerical illustration.
3.3 Optimal switching time
At the switching time, T , and by continuity, the state variable y must verify that
yI(T ) = yII(T ). (12)
Similarly, the costate variable must verify that
λI(T ) = λII(T ). (13)
Usually, as in Boucekkine et al (2004, 2013, 2016), in the study of the optimal switch-
ing in optimal control problems with a unique decision maker, a transversality condi-
tion is imposed on the maximized Hamiltonian at the switching time T . In that case,
the maximized Hamiltonian is exactly the same immediately before and immediately
after the switch.
However, under the current dynamic game setting, it is different. Before and after
the switch, there are different decision makers as stated in the Introduction. Before the
switch, each individual player takes her own optimal decisions, while after the switch,
it is a join choice. Thus, it is improper to equalize the maximized Hamiltonian before
and after the switch, even with identical players.
Therefore, we impose that the shadow values are the same before and after the
switching. In our example where y measures the stock of CO2, this transversality con-
dition implies that the shadow value of pollution does not change immediately due to
the signature of some agreement or protocol. Instead it takes some time for the shadow
value to change, while immediate changes come from the choice variables.
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Combining (12) and (13), we obtain that the values of λ0(T ) and C1(T ):
λ0(T ) =
2E1(T )− (µ+ δ)A1(T )
(µ+ δ)A2(T )− 2E2(T ) ,
C1(T ) =
E1(T ) + E2(T )λ0
µ+ δ
e−µT ,
(14)
where
A1(t) =
(ν1 + δ)e
ν2t − (ν2 + δ)eν1t
ν1 − ν2 y0 + (yP (t)− y), A2(t) =
2(eν1t − eν2t)
ν1 − ν2 ,
and
E1(t) =
(ν1 + δ)(ν2 + δ)(e
ν2t − eν1t)
2(ν1 − ν2) y0 + (λP (t)− λ), E2(t) =
(ν1 + δ)e
ν1t − (ν2 + δ)eν2t
ν1 − ν2 .
Thus, substituting (14) into (9) and (5), we could obtain the explicit optimal trajec-
tories in both periods.
The optimal switching time T is given by the optimization problem (2). With the
above explicit solutions, it only remains to calculate the social welfare in the two peri-
ods, i.e. WI(T ) and WII(T ). It is easy to check that
e−rT
2
WII =
(
a2 − λ2 − by2
2
)
e−2rT
r
− [(µ+ δ)λ+ 2by]C1 e(µ−2r)T
r − µ
−
[
(µ+ δ)2 + 4b
2
]
C21
e(2µ−2r)T
r − 2µ ,
(15)
in which C1 = C1(T ) is given by (14).
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Similarly, the first period social welfare WI is given by
WI =
[
a2 − (λ̂P + λP )2 − b(ŷP + yP )2
2
]
(e−rT − 1)
−r
−
[
(ĉ− λ̂P )2
2
+
b(â− ŷP )2
2
]
(e(2ν1−r)T − 1)
2ν1 − r
−
[
(d̂− λP )2
2
+
b (̂b− yP )2
2
]
(e(2ν2−r)T − 1)
2ν2 − r
−
[
(ĉ− λ̂P )(d̂− λP ) + b (â− ŷP )(̂b− yP )
] (e(ν1+ν2−r)T − 1)
ν1 + ν2 − r
−
[
(ĉ− λ̂P )(λ̂P + λP ) + b (â− ŷP )(ŷP + yP )
] (e(ν1−r)T − 1)
ν1 − r
−
[
(d̂− λP )(λ̂P + λP ) + b (̂b− yP )(ŷP + yP )
] (e(ν2−r)T − 1)
ν2 − r ,
(16)
in which â, b̂, ĉ, d̂ depend on the switching time T as well, via λ0(T ).
The first order condition from (2) yields
dWI(T )
dT
+
e−rT
2
[
−rWII(T ) + dWII(T )
dT
]
= 0. (17)
Intuitively, the first term should be nonnegative, i.e. the longer the time period
[0, T ], the higher the welfare it yields (otherwise T = 0 already). The second term
should be non-positive (otherwise T = +∞). Nevertheless, due to the complexity
of expressions (15) and (16), the study of an explicit form becomes cumbersome, and
the study of the properties and impacts become impossible. Thus, it is not wise to
continue working on the search of explicit solutions. Instead, we focus in next section
on numerical simulations to illustrate the impacts of important parameters, such as, the
efficient parameter, a, and dis-utility parameter, b, as well as the initial condition, y0.
Although the model is not realistically calibrated, the qualitative pattern is illustrative.
4 Numerical illustration
This section illustrates numerically the theoretical results obtained in the previous sec-
tions. First, we compare the optimal switching time as a function of the initial endow-
12
ment of the state variable, y0. In a second set of exercises, we compute the optimal
dynamic trajectories of the state variable y and of the optimal choice x.
4.1 Optimal switching time
To seize the importance of all the elements of the model, we have computed the optimal
switching time under various scenarios for both a and b. In all exercises, r = 0.0015 and
δ = 0.01. The time discount is in line with the most recent literature (see the literature
following Stern, 2006).
We begin by exploring the role of a. Setting b = 0.000095 we choose an economy
which loses little utility with y. Two economies are compared: a performant economy,
which can extract high utility from the same amount of the choice variable x, for which
a = 0.115; and a second less efficient economy, in which a = 0.109. Figure 1 shows the
optimal switching time and the associated overall welfare when the initial endowment
of the state variable ranges from y0 = 50 to y0 = 100.5
Figure 1: Optimal T . Left: role of a when b = 0.000095. Right: role of b when a = 0.09.
Interpreting y as the CO2 stock and x as consumption, a is a measure of the effi-
5The switching time trajectories displayed in Figures 1 and 2 are maxima of (2), since they verify the
second order condition as shown in Appendix B.
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ciency of the economy. Indeed, with the same amount of the resource, the higher a,
the more of the final consumption good we obtain. Low levels of y0 correspond to
economies that are not too polluted initially. By the same token, high y0 correspond to
economies that are already very polluted at the beginning of the game.
On the left panel of Figure 1, we see that players always decide to play coopera-
tively, that is 0 ≤ T < ∞. They cooperate from T = 0 when y0 is relatively low. When
the environmental quality is high, players join as soon as possible to preserve the en-
vironment and avoid the loss of utility induced by pollution. Besides, switching times
are increasing functions of the initial stock of y0. If y is the stock of CO2 emissions, then
clean economies start cooperating earlier. Indeed, earlier cooperation reduces global
emissions and ensures a higher production in the future. Conversely, when economies
are relatively dirtier, y0 is relatively high, then they start cooperating later as if the dam-
age was already too large to struggle against. Finally, note that T is always smaller for
a = 0.115. Efficient economies cooperate sooner since their advantage in production
allows them to obtain more of the final good producing the same amount of pollu-
tion. Note that better performing economies can cope better with possible losses in
consumption arising upon cooperation.
Let us study next the negative effect of the state variable in utility, as captured by
parameter b. The right panel in Figure 1 shows optimal switching times when a = 0.09
for two values of b: a high level of b = 0.00015 and a low level b = 0.000095. Again, un-
derstanding y as CO2 emissions, an economy with a low b corresponds to an economy
less sensitive to pollution, such as a very small open economy or an economy embod-
ied with sufficient forest or water source to absorb important amounts of CO2. These
economies start playing cooperatively earlier in order to maintain y at a moderate level.
4.2 Optimal dynamic trajectories
Next, let us illustrate the dynamic trajectories for the economy underlining the roles of
a and b in the dynamics of the optimal control and state variables. In the first exercise,
a = 0.5 and we compare two economies which differ in their sensitivity to pollution.
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In the less sensitive b = 0.000095 and in the more sensitive b = 0.00015. In both cases
the economy is initially endowed with y0 = 75. Figure 2 shows our results for the state
variable, y, and for the control variable per capita, x.
Figure 2: Dynamics of y(·) and x(·). a = 0.5.
The results are in line with the precedent theoretical analysis. Indeed, we knew that
the steady state of y, yss, decreases with b. Hence the long-term of y for b = 0.000095
is higher than for b = 0.00015. The less sensitive economy can maintain a higher pro-
duction level and afford higher consumption because it loses less welfare from CO2
emissions. When b is low, players start playing cooperatively from the beginning and
the economy accumulates more pollution.
The right panel of Figure 2 reveals the thinking of the policy maker. Compared to
their steady states, both economies start with a highly polluted environment, which
makes them lose a significant amount of welfare. Hence, the policy maker decides
not to consume during a certain period of time. This is true when b = 0.000095 and
that players play together from t = 0, as well as in the more sensitive case, when
b = 0.00015, and that there are two policy makers from t = 0 till T = 18.4. Note that
the less sensitive economy starts consuming before and it consumes more.
Our last exercise compares two economies which differ in their efficiency level let-
ting b = 0.000095. In the first, a = 0.5, and in the second, the efficiency level doubles
15
the first, a = 1. As shown in Proposition 1, the steady state of y keeps the same pro-
portion than efficiency. Indeed, yss = 23.23 when a = 0.5 and yss = 46.46 when a = 1.
Our results are displayed in Figure 4. The most salient feature is that the most effi-
cient economy does not sacrifice initial consumption in order to preserve y at a low
level. Its technological advantage allows the policy maker to choose positive levels of
consumption from t = 0.
Figure 3: Dynamics of y(·) and x(·). b = 0.000095.
5 From the cooperative to the non-cooperative game
In the previous sections, if players decide to join at time T , they will play cooperatively
forever after. In other words, their commitment to some protocol, or union, or agree-
ment is irreversible. However, if it was possible to exit in some future time, choices and
trajectories would be more complicated. In this section, we extend the previous study
to include the possibility of a future exit. The steps of the game are the following:
Step 1. The two players play the non-cooperative differential game until time T1.
Under the symmetric assumption, the revenue of the identical players is VI(T1, T2)
Step 2. From time T1 until T2, the two players play cooperatively. Denote the join
revenue as VII(T1, T2).
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Step 3. One of the two players exits the cooperative game at T2, thus from T2 on-
wards, the two players play the non-cooperative differential games again. Denote the
revenue in this period as VIII(T1, T2).
Then the optimal choice of switching times should be given by
max
T1,T2
[
VI(T1, T2) + e
−rT1VII(T1, T2) + e−rT2VIII(T1, T2)
]
. (18)
Mathematically, this more complicated differential game can be solved by back-
ward induction by reversing the calculation order of the above Section 3. Similarly,
numerical investigation can be performed the same way as Section 4. Therefore, we do
not need to do this exercise here in detail.
6 Conclusion
We investigate both theoretically and numerically some dynamic game settings where
players choose to switch from noncooperative competition to cooperate (or vise versa)
and which automatically change the decision makers as well. The explicit conditions of
open-loop strategic switching conditions are presented, though it can not be fully an-
alytical. We rely on numerical simulation and demonstrate the importance of parame-
ters. Not surprising, given the intrinsic nature of open-loop strategies, both switching
time and the social welfare depend essentially on the initial condition of the game,
but neither were monotonic. The efficient parameter plays very important role in not
only the decision of switching from noncooperative to cooperative, but also the choice
of consumption. High efficient parameter may cover the side effects, such as leading
to high pollution as a by product. Of course, different damaging parameter may be
introduced between non-cooperative and cooperative games, which is a future work.
Furthermore, it is easy to imagine the situation where the two players are asymmetric
or there are more than two players. We do believe that the current study paves the way
to handle a much wider class of problems, beyond the examples we presented in the
Introduction.
17
A Appendix. Proof of Proposition 2
Recall the dynamic system as y˙I(t) = −δyI + 2λI + 2a,λ˙I(t) = by + (r + δ)λI ,
It is easy to obtain the associated eigenvalues
ν1,2 =
r ±√r2 + 4(δ(r + δ) + 2b)
2
with ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0, and associated eigenvectors
−→vi =
 2
νi + δ
 , i = 1, 2.
Define matrix
M(t) = (−→v1 −→v2)
 eν1t 0
0 eν2t
 =
 2eν1t 2eν2t
(ν1 + δ)e
ν1t (ν2 + δ)e
ν2t
 .
Thus the inverse matrix of M(t) is
M−1(t) =
 − ν2+δ2(ν1−2)e−ν1t e−ν1tν1−ν2
ν1+δ
2(ν1−ν2)e
−ν2t − e−ν2t
ν1−ν2
 .
The unique solution of the system is then given by y(t)
λ(t)
 = M(t)M−1(0)
 y0
λ(0)
+M(t)∫ t
0
M−1(s)
 2a
0
 ds,
in which λ(0) is undetermined. Substituting M(t), M−1(t) and M−1(0) into the above
matrix algebra and taking integrals, we obtain the explicit solution in Proposition 2.
That completes the proof.
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B Appendix. Second order condition.
Figure 4 shows the value of the second order derivative of (2) associated to the ex-
amples in Section 4. The graphs show that the second derivative is negative for all
values of y0 in the four examples. Hence, the switching times T in Figure 1 is always a
maximum.
Figure 4: Second order conditions.
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